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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Roy T. Gwin appeals, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress, and the unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed it imposed upon 
/ 
his conviction for driving under the influence with a persistent violator enhancement. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The district court related the following factual background for this case: 
On August 9, 2010 the police were notified of a physical 
disturbance on Golf Course Road. Deputy McRoberts arrived on the 
scene and spoke with David Gwin who stated he and his father had been 
in an altercation and that his father had left driving a green, Chevrolet 
Blazer. Deputy Summers was notified by McRoberts to locate a green, 
Chevrolet Blazer driving in the area and Summers observed such a 
vehicle and initiated [a] traffic stop. The driver was David Gwin's father, 
Roy Gwin, the defendant. Deputy Summers after the traffic stop 
determined that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and the 
defendant was then arrested for DUI. 
(R., pp.112-13.) 
The State charged Gwin with felony driving under the influence with a persistent 
violator enhancement. (R., pp.69-74.) Gwin filed a motion to suppress evidence, 
challenging the reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop. (R., pp.95-96.) The 
district court denied Gwin's suppression motion. (R., pp.112-19.) Gwin entered a 
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his 
suppression motion. (R., pp.143-44.) The district court entered judgment of conviction 
on the felony driving under the influence, finding Gwin to be a persistent violator of the 
law, and imposed a unified sentence of 20 years with three fixed. (R., pp.151-56.) 
Gwin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.158-60.) 
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ISSUES 
Gwin states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gwin's motion to 
suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified 
sentence of twenty years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Gwin following 
his plea of guilty to felony driving under the influence and a persistent 
violator enhancement? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Gwin failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress? 
2. Has Gwin failed to establish an abuse of discretion by the district court in 
imposing a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed upon Gwin's conviction 




Gwin has Failed to Show Error in the District Court's Denial of his Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Although he concedes that officers had "reasonable suspicion to conduct an 
investigative detention," Gwin asserts that they "did not have reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a traffic stop," and therefore the district court erred in denying his suppression 
motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Gwin's argument that there are different reasonable 
suspicion standards for a "detention" and a "traffic stop" is without merit. He has failed 
to show either clear error in the district court's factual findings, or error in its application 
of law to those findings. The district court's denial of his suppression motion should 
therefore be affirmed. 
B. Standard of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 
P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. 
App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State 
v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Denied Gwin's Suppression Motion 
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's 
occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Because a routine 
traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analyzed under the principles 
of an investigative detention as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 
440 U.S. at 653-54; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific 
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is 
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the 
rational inferences that naturally follow from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97, 821 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1991). While the quantity 
and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that 
necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), 
reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion" United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The 
reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of 
the circumstances at the time of the seizure. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18; State v. 
Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Schumacher, 136 
Idaho 509, 515, 37 P.3d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
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Reasonable suspicion may be supplied by an informant's tip or a citizen's report 
of suspected criminal activity. State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99,101, 15 P.3d 334,336 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
Id. 
Whether information from such a source is sufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion depends upon the content and reliability of the information 
presented by the source, including whether the informant reveals her 
identity and the basis of her knowledge. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 
325, 330 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972). An anonymous tip, standing alone, is 
generally not enough to justify a stop because "an anonymous tip alone 
seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity .... " 
White, 496 U.S. at 329. See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 
(2000). However, when the information from an anonymous tip bears 
sufficient indicia of reliability or is corroborated by independent police 
observations, it may provide justification for a stop. White, 496 U.S. at 
331. Where the information comes from a known citizen informant rather 
than an anonymous tipster, the citizen's disclosure of her identity, which 
carries the risk of accountability if the allegations turn out to be fabricated, 
is generally deemed adequate to show veracity and reliability. Gates, 462 
U.S. at 233; Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47; State v. O'Bryan, 96 Idaho 548, 
552, 531 P.2d 1193, 1197 (1975); State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47, 
981 P .2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999); Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 
907, 894 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The district court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Gwin as 
they performed their investigative functions. (R., pp.118-19.) This determination is 
amply supported by the Record. Police received an anonymous tip that there was an 
altercation taking place in the middle of Golf Course Road. (Tr., p.7, L.8 - p.8, L.8; 
p.20, L.16 - p.21, L.1.) Officers McRoberts and Summers, in separate cars, went to 
investigate the disturbance. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-17.) Officer McRoberts found David Gwin 
in the vicinity of the reported altercation and contacted him. (Tr., p.8, L.12 - p.9, L.5.) 
5 
David Gwin's statement and appearance corroborated the information from the 
anonymous tipster regarding the altercation; he confirmed that he was a participant in 
the fight and told police that his father, the other participant, was in the vicinity driving a 
green Chevy Blazer. (Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.13, L.1.) Shortly thereafter, Officer Summers 
spotted a green Chevy Blazer in the near vicinity that matched the description and 
stopped the vehicle to investigate. (Tr., p.24, Ls.2-21.) This occurred in the early hours 
of a Monday morning, in a rural area, when there was very little traffic. (R., pp.14-17.) 
Denying Gwin's suppression motion, the district court noted: 
The deputies new [sic] at the time that the traffic stop was made that the 
defendant and his son had been in a fight. The altercation resulted in a 
citizen's call to dispatch. The defendant had left his son stranded in the 
early morning hours. The deputies had only one version of the altercation. 
The defendant's vehicle was spotted in the area of the altercation and the 
traffic stop was in the vicinity of the altercation. This court is persuaded 
that given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Summers had a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of the stopped vehicle 
was the same as the individual involved in the altercation, a possible 
crime. Given the nature of the altercation, an officer could have thought 
that the crimes of battery or assault could have been committed. This 
court is not convinced that just because David Gwin did not appear to be 
physically injured and did not wish to press charges that no crime may 
have been committed and further investigation was unwarranted. This 
court finds that it is reasonable to stop a green, Chevrolet Blazer; near the 
scene of the altercation, at 2:00 a.m. on a Monday, when few cars are 
likely to be on the road, let alone matching the description; based on the 
totality of the circumstances. This combination of circumstances allowed 
for a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the vehicle stop to 
further investigate the report of the altercation between the defendant and 
his son. 
(R., pp.118-19.) Gwin has failed to establish clear error in any of these factual findings, 
and Gwin has failed to establish error in the district court's application of the law to 
those factual findings. 
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Instead Gwin argues that, though the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct 
an investigative detention, they lacked reasonable suspicion to enforce a traffic stop on 
Gwin, because his son was not pressing charges. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.) In 
addition to its self-contradictory nature, this argument that a victim willing to press 
charges is a necessary element of reasonable suspicion is unsupported by any legal 
authority and need not be addressed by this Court on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P .2d 966, 970 (1996). Rather, to perform an investigative 
detention, police only need articulable facts that justify their suspicion "that the detained 
person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho 
at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223. As the district court correctly noted below, "whether or not 
David Gwin wants to press charges, that does not factor in as to whether there still was 
a crime committed or possibly committed." (Tr., p.33, Ls.19-22.) Having failed to 
establish either clear error in the district court's factual findings or error in the application 
of relevant legal standards to those findings, Gwin has failed to show any error in the 
district court's denial of his suppression motion. The judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
11. 
Gwin has Failed to Establish an Abuse of the District Court's Sentencing Discretion 
Gwin asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and 
executed a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed following his felony 
driving under the influence conviction with a persistent violator enhancement, in light of 
his history of substance abuse and other allegedly mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief, 
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pp.9-12.) Gwin has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion. 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To 
carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of 
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Though courts review the whole sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed 
portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. 
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, 
the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. 
The facts of the present crime are straightforward: Upon pulling Gwin over, 
Deputy Summers recognized that Gwin was drunk. (PSI, p.2; R., pp.14-17.) A 
breathalyzer confirmed that Gwin was driving over the legal limit, as he blew a .13. (Id.) 
This was not Gwin's first DUI; it wasn't his first felony DUI. (See PSI, pp.3-5.) Gwin's 
first DUI was in May, 1991 (PSI, p.3), he got another in November, 1991 (id.), his first 
felony DUI came in 1992 (id.), and he received his second felony DUI in 2007 (PSI, p.5). 
This is Gwin's third felony DUI. Gwin has had multiple opportunities to stop driving 
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under the influence, yet has failed. And Gwin's lengthy criminal history, encompassing 
the past two decades, is not limited to DUl's. Additionally, Gwin has been charged with 
many felonies and misdemeanors, including Grand Theft, narcotics and paraphernalia 
possession, malicious injury to property, driving without privileges, and uttering forged 
documents, and for violating many probations and paroles. (PSI, pp.3-5.) 
The district court appropriately considered all of the relevant factors when 
crafting and imposing Gwin's sentence. (Tr., p.83, L.17 - p.84, L.3.) The district court 
noted that this was Gwin's sixth felony conviction, and third felony DUI conviction. (Tr., 
p.84, Ls.9-18.) The district court also noted that Gwin had received extensive treatment 
for his alcoholism and rehabilitative programming, yet he continued to both abuse 
alcohol and to drive under the influence. (Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.87, L.18.) The district court 
did recognize that Gwin had improved over time. (Tr., p.84, Ls.11-16; p.88, Ls.2-5.) 
However, that minor improvement could not outweigh the significant risk Gwin poses to 
the community as a habitual drunk driver. (Tr., p.84, L.17 - p.85, L.6; p.87, L.16- p.88, 
L 10.) As the Court has said, "[t]he proverbial drunk driver cuts a wide path of death, 
pain and grief, as well as untold physical and emotional injury, across the roads of Idaho 
and the nation." State v. Puga, 131 Idaho 89, 90, 952 P.2d 904, 905 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoted Tr., p.85, Ls.2-6). 
Gwin argues that his history of substance abuse and professed willingness to 
undergo treatment should have been weighed as stronger mitigating factors. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) This argument is unavailing. A history of alcohol abuse is 
not a mitigating factor in relation to a crime which requires not only the repeated abuse 
of alcohol, but driving while abusing alcohol. See Oliver, 144 Idaho at 727, 170 P.3d at 
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392. Gwin also argues that the support of family and friends should result in a more 
lenient sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Gwin's argument, however, does not 
change the fact that despite such support in the past, Gwin still repeatedly chose to 
drink and drive. Because the support of family members has yet to protect the 
community from Gwin's driving under the influence, Gwin has failed to show that the 
district court was required to conclude that it somehow would this time. 
The district court addressed the relevant factors to be considered at the 
sentencing hearing and exercised its discretion in imposing a reasonable sentence. 
Gwin has failed to establish any abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. The 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
Gwin's motion to suppress evidence, and affirm Gwin's conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 17th day of October, 2011. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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